CHAPTER FIVE

NAMING AND SAYING

The essay adopts the Tractarian view that configurations of objects are expressed by configurations of names. Two alternatives are considered: The objects in atomic facts are (1) without exception *particulars*; (2) one or more particulars plus a *universal* (Gustav Bergmann). On (1) a mode of configuration is always an empirical relation: on (2) it is the logical nexus of 'exemplification'. It is argued that (1) is both Wittgenstein's view in the *Tractatus* and correct. It is also argued that exemplification is a 'quasi-semantical' relation, and that it (and universals) are "in the world" only in that broad sense in which the 'world' includes linguistic norms and roles viewed (thus in translating) from the standpoint of a fellow participant.

I

The topics I am about to discuss have their roots in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. My point of departure will be Professor Irving Copi's paper on "Objects, Properties and Relations in the *Tractatus*"[1] in which, after a decisive critique of certain misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's so-called picture theory of meaning with particular reference to relational statements, he proceeds to attribute to Wittgenstein, on the basis of a by no means implausible interpretation of certain texts, a puzzling construction of Wittgenstein's objects as 'bare particulars'.[2]

I shall not waste time by formulating the misinterpretations in question and summarizing Copi's admirably lucid critique. For my concern is with the theory of relational statements as pictures which, in my opinion, he correctly attributes to Wittgenstein, and, specifically, with the power of this theory to illuminate traditional philosophical puzzles concerning predication generally.

The crucial passage, of course, is 3.1432, "We must not say: 'The complex sign "aRb" says "a stands in the relation R to b"'; but we must say, '*That* "a" stands in a certain relation to

"b" says *that* aRb.'" Part of Wittgenstein's point is that though names and statements are both complex in their empirical character as instances of sign designs, and hence, from his point of view, are equally *facts*, the fact that a name consists (in various ways) of related parts is not relevant to its character as name in the way in which the division of such a statement as (schematically)

aRb

into just the parts 'a', 'R' and 'b' is to its character as making the statement it does. The latter parts are themselves functioning (though not in the same way) as signs, whereas no part of a name is functioning as a sign. But the crucial point that Wittgenstein is making emerges when we ask 'What are the parts of the statement in question the relation of which to one another is essential to its character as statement?' For in spite of the fact that the obvious answer would seem to be 'the *three* expressions "a", "R" and "b",' this answer is incorrect. 'R' is, indeed, functioning in a broad sense as a sign, and is certainly involved in the statement's saying what it does, but it is involved, according to Wittgenstein, in quite a different way than the signs 'a' and 'b'. To say that 'R' is functioning as a predicate, whereas 'a' and 'b' are functioning as names, is to *locate* the difference, but to remain open to perplexity. What Wittgenstein tells us is that while superfcially regarded the statement is a concatenation of the three parts 'a', 'R' and 'b', viewed more profoundly it is a two-termed fact, with 'R' coming in to the statement as bringing it about that the expressions 'a' and 'b' are dyadically related in a certain way, i.e. as bringing it about that the expressions 'a' and 'b' are related as having an 'R' between them. And he is making the point that what is essential to any statement which will say that aRb is not that the names 'a' and 'b' have a relation word between them (or before them or in any other relation to

them), but that these names be related (dyadically) *in some way or other* whether or not this involves the use of a third sign design. Indeed, he is telling us that it is philosophically clarifying to recognize that instead of expressing the proposition that a is next to b by writing 'is next to' between 'a' and 'b', we could write 'a' in some relation to 'b' using only these signs. In a perspicuous language this is what we would do. Suppose that the Jumblies have such a language. It contains no relation words, but has the same name expressions as our tidied up English. Then we could translate Jumblese into English by making such statements as

$$\text{`}^{a}_{b}\text{'} \text{ (in Jumblese) means } \textit{a is next to b}$$

and be on our way to philosophical clarification. Of particular interest in this connection would be the Jumblese translation of *Appearance and Reality*.

It will be noticed that I have correlated the fact that in 'aRb' the 'R' plays the predicate role with the fact that in Jumblese the proposition expressed by 'aRb' would be expressed by relating the two names without the use of a predicate expression. Now in Frege's system, 'R' would be said to stand for (*bedeuten*) a concept, whereas 'a' and 'b' stand for objects. Thus what Wittgenstein puts by saying that configurations of objects are represented by configurations of names (3.21)—so that Jumblese '$^{a}_{b}$' and PMese 'aRb' are equally configurations of two names, though the latter is not perspicuously so—could also be put by saying that to represent that certain objects satisfy an n-adic concept, one makes their names satisfy an n-adic concept.[3] Roughly, Wittgenstein's confgurations are the counterparts of a sub-set of Frege's concepts, and Wittgenstein is taking issue with Frege by insisting that a perspicuous language would contain no concept words functioning predicatively, that is to say, as 'R' functions when we say that aRb. How a perspicuous language would do the job done by concept words in their non-

predicative use is something on which Wittgenstein throws less light, though his sketchy treatment of the parallel problem of how a perspicuous language would handle belief statements in which, according to Frege, the *Bedeutung* of the subordinate clause is what would ordinarily be its sense, gives some clue to the answer.

Now the above remarks adumbrate many topics of importance for ontology and the philosophy of logic. Some of them I shall pick up at a later stage in the argument. For the moment, however, I shall concentrate on the question, 'What sort of thing are Wittgenstein's objects?' And the first thing I shall say is that in my opinion Copi is undoubtedly right in insisting that Wittgenstein's objects are particulars. To put the same point in a somewhat different way, Wittgenstein's names are names of particulars. This is not to say, of course, that expressions which function in unperspicuous languages in a superficially name-like way, but do not name particulars, are meaningless. It is simply to say that they would not translate into the names of a perspicuous language. Roughly, unperspicuous name-like expressions fall into two categories for Wittgenstein: (1) Those which would translate into a perspicuous language as, on Russell's theory of descriptions, statements involving descriptive phrases translate into unique existentials (compare Wittgenstein's treatment of complexes in 3.24); (2)—which is more interesting—those which would not translate at all into that part of a perspicuous language which is used to make statements about what is or is not the case in the world. It is the latter which are in a special sense without meaning, though not in any ordinary sense meaningless. The 'objects' or 'individuals' or 'logical subjects' they mention are pseudo-objects in that to 'mention them' is to call attention to those features of discourse about what is or is not the case in the world which 'show themselves', i.e. are present in a perspicuous language not as words, but in the manner in which words are combined.[4] Thus it is perfectly legitimate to say that there

are ‘objects’ other than particulars, and to make statements about them. These objects (complexes aside) are not in the world, however, nor do statements about them tell us how things stand in the world. In Wittgenstein’s terminology no statements about such objects are ‘pictures’, and, therefore, in the sense in which ‘pictures’ have sense they are without sense.

Now one can conceive of a philosopher who agrees with Wittgenstein that in a perspicuous language the fact that two objects stand in a dyadic relation would be represented by making their names stand in a dyadic relation, but who rejects the idea that the only objects or individuals *in the world* are particulars. Such a philosopher might distinguish, for example, within the fact that a certain sense-datum (supposing there to be such entities) is green, between two objects, a *particular* of which the name might be ‘a’, and an item which, though equally an *object* or *individual*, is not a *particular*. Let us suppose that the name of this object is ‘green’.[5] Let us say that green is a universal rather than a particular, and that among universals it is a quality rather than a relation. According to this philosopher,[6] the perspicuous way of saying that a is green (abstracting from problems pertaining to temporal reference) is by putting the two names ‘a’ and ‘green’ in some relation, the same relation in which we would put ‘b’ and ‘red’ if we wished to say that b is red. Let us suppose that we write ‘Green a’.

Our previous discussion suggests the question: What would be the *unperspicuous* way of saying what is said by ‘Green a’, i.e. which would stand to ‘Green a’ as, on Wittgenstein’s view ‘aRb’ stands to, say, ‘$\frac{a}{b}$’? The philosopher I have in mind proposes the following answer:

a exemplifes green

And this is not unexpected, for where, as in this case, two objects are involved, what is needed for the purpose of *un*perspicuity is a two place predicate which is appropriately concatenated

with the name of a particular on one side and the name of a universal on the other, and this is one of the jobs we philosophers pay "exemplifies" to do. Thus this philosopher would be saying that as on Wittgenstein's view the perspicuous way of saying that a is next to b is by writing 'a' in some relation to 'b', so the perspicuous way of saying that a exemplifies green is by writing 'a' in some relation to 'green'. Having thus made use of Wittgenstein's ladder, he would climb off on to his own pinnacle. For he must claim that Wittgenstein made a profound point with the wrong examples. He must, in short, deny that the perspicuous way of saying that a is next to b is by writing 'a' in some relation to 'b'. That this is so is readily seen from the following considerations.

Exemplification is not the sort of thing that philosophers would ordinarily call an empirical relation. This title is usually reserved for such relations as spatial juxtaposition and temporal succession. Yet exemplification might well be an—or perhaps the—empirical relation[7] in a more profound sense than is usually recognized, as would be the case if the simplest atomic facts in the world were of the kind *perspicuously* represented by 'Green a' and *unperspicuously* represented by 'a exemplifes green'.

For let us see what happens to what we ordinarily refer to as empirical relations if relational statements are approached in a manner consistent with the above treatment of 'a is green'. According to the latter, the fact that a is green is perspicuously represented by the juxtaposition of two names, 'a' and 'green', and unperspicuously represented by a sentence which contains three expressions, two of which are names, while the third, which might be taken by unperceptive philosophers to be a third *name*, actually serves the purpose of bringing it about that a distinctive dyadic relation obtains between the names. It is clear, then, that the parallel treatment of 'a is below b' would claim that it is perspicuously represented by a suitable

juxtaposition of *three* names, ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘below’, thus,

Below a b

and unperspicuously represented by a sentence which uses *four* expressions, thus, perhaps

Exempl[8] a b below

I will comment later on the interpretation of ‘below’ as a name, and on the fact that it is *prima facie* less plausible than the similar move with respect to ‘green’. I should, however, preface the following remarks by saying that I share with Professor Bergmann the sentiment which might be expressed by saying that ordinary grammar is the paper money of wise men but the gold of fools. For my immediate purpose is to contrast the Tractarian theory of predication with that of Professor Bergmann, who, though he decidedly prefers Saul to Paul, is by no means an orthodox exponent of the old testament; and I regard the point as of great philosophical significance.

According to the Tractatus, then, the fact that a is below b is *perspicuously* represented by an expression consisting of *two* names dyadically related, and *unperspicuously* represented by an expression containing, in addition to these two names, a two-place predicate expression. According to Professor Bergmann, if I understand him correctly, such facts as that *a* is below *b* are perspicuously represented by expressions consisting of *three* names triadically related, and unperspicuously represented by an expression containing, in addition to these three names (suitably punctuated) an expression having the force of ‘exemplifes’. What exactly does this difference amount to? And which view is closer to the truth?

To take up the first question first, the difference can be reformulated in such a way as to bring out its kinship with the old issue between realists and nominalists. Wittgenstein is telling us that the only objects in the world are particulars, Bergmann is telling us that the world

includes as objects both particulars and universals. Bergmann, of course, has his own razor and in his own way gives the world a close shave, but not quite as close as does Wittgenstein. Another way of putting the difference is by saying that whereas for Wittgenstein (Saul) it is *empirical* relations in the world that are perspicuously expressed by relating the names of their relata, for Bergmann empirical relations appear in discourse about the world as *nominata*, and it is *exemplification* and *only* exemplification which is perspicuously expressed by relating the names of its relata.

To clarify the latter way of putting the matter, some terminological remarks are in order. If we so use the term 'relation' that to say of something that it is a relation is to say that it is perspicuously represented in discourse by a configuration of expressions rather than by the use of a separate expression, then for Bergmann there is, refinements aside, only *one* relation, i.e. exemplification,[9] and what are ordinarily said to be relations, for example *below*, would occur in the world as *relata*. Thus if we were to continue to use the term 'relation' in such a way that *below* would be a relation, then exemplification, as construed by Bergmann would not be a relation. For although, as he sees it, both *below* and exemplification are in the world, the former appears in discourse as a nominatum, whereas exemplification does not, indeed *can* not.

To keep matters straight, it will be useful to introduce the term 'nexus' in such a way that to say of something that it is a nexus is to say that it is perspicuously represented in discourse by a configuration of expressions rather than by a separate expression. If we do this, we can contrast Bergmann and Wittgenstein as follows:

> *Wittgenstein*: There are many nexus in the world. Simple relations of matter of fact are *nexus*. All objects or individuals which form a nexus are particulars, i.e. individuals of type 0. There is no relation or nexus of exemplifcation in the world.

> *Bergmann*: There is only one[10] nexus, exemplifcation. Every atomic state of affairs contains at least one (and, if the thesis of elementarism be true, at most one) individual which is not a particular.

If one so uses the term 'ineffable' that to eff something is to signify it by using a name, then Wittgenstein's view would be that what are ordinarily called relations are ineffable, for they are all nexus and are expressed (whether perspicuously or not) by configurations of names. For Bergmann, on the other hand, what are ordinarily called relations are effed; it is exemplification which is ineffable.

Before attempting to evaluate these contrasting positions, let us beat about the neighboring bushes. And for a start, let us notice that Wittgenstein tells us that atomic facts are configurations of objects, thus

> 2.0272 The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact.

The question I wish to raise is how strictly we are to interpret the plural of the word 'object' in this context. Specifically, could there be a configuration of one object? It must be granted that an affirmative answer would sound odd. But, then, it sounds odd to speak of drawing a conclusion from a null class of premises. Philosophers of a 'reconstructionist' bent have often found it clarifying to treat one thing as a "limiting case" of another; and if Russell, for one, was willing to speak of a quality as a monadic relation, there is no great initial improbability to the idea that Wittgenstein might be willing to speak of a monadic configuration.

Would he be willing to do so? The question is an important one, and calls for a careful examination of the text. I do not think that 2.0272, taken by itself, throws much light on the matter. Yet when it is taken together with such passages as

2.031 In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way

2.03 In the atomic fact objects hang in one another like the members of a chain

which are accompanied by no hint that there might be monadic ‘combinations’ or, so to speak, chains with a single link, the cumulative effect is to buttress the thesis that there is no provision in the *Tractatus* for monadic atomic facts.

Yet at first sight, at least, this would not seem to be inevitable. After all, one who says that the fact that a is below b would be perspicuously represented by an expression in which the name ‘a’ stands in a dyadic relation (to ‘b’) might be expected to say that the fact that a is green would be perspicuously represented by an expression in which the name ‘a’ stands in a monadic relation, i.e., in a more usual way of speaking, is of a certain quality. Thus one can imagine a philosopher who says that in a perspicuous language, monadic atomic facts would be represented by writing the name of the single object they contain in various colors or in various styles of type. The idea is a familiar one. Is there any reason to suppose that it was not available to Wittgenstein?

One line of thought might be that in such a symbolism we could not distinguish between a name and a statement. After all, a name has to be written in some style or other, and if so, wouldn’t every occurrence of a name, in this hypothetical symbolism, have by virtue of its style the force of a statement, and therefore not be a name at all ? This objection, however, overestimates the extent to which empirical similarities between expressions imply similarity of linguistic role. Obviously, writing ‘a’ alongside ‘b’ might be saying that a temporally precedes b, whereas an ‘a’ below a ‘b’ might have no meaning at all. Thus, to write ‘a’ in boldface might be to say that a is green, whereas an ‘a’ in ordinary type might function merely as a name. How this might be so will be discussed later on. My present point is simply that to understand

expressions is to know which of the many facts about them (shape, size, color, etc.) are relevant (and in what way) to their meaning. It could surely be the case that in a perspicuous language the fact that a heap of ink was a token of a certain name was a matter of its being an instance of a certain letter of the alphabet written in one or another of a certain number of manners. But one or more of these manners might be, so to speak, 'neutral' in that to write the name in such a manner would not be to make an assertion, but simply to write the name, whereas to write the name in other manners would be to make various assertions. Only, then, in the case of the non-'neutral' manners would the writing of the name be the assertion of a monadic fact.

Another line of thought would be to the effect that in a language in which monadic atomic facts (if such there be) were expressed by writing single names in various manners, there would be a diffculty about variables—not about variables ranging over particulars, for here the device of having special letters for variables could be used, but about variables such as would be the counterparts of the monadic predicate variables of *Principia* notation. Thus we could represent the sentential function 'x is green' by using the variable 'x' and writing it in boldface, thus

x

But how would one say of a that it was of some quality or other? What would correspond to 'a is f' and '(Ef) a is f' as 'x' to 'x is green' and '(Ex) x' to '(Ex) x is green'? Would we not have to introduce an expression to be the variable after all, one can't write a manner by itself—and if one has separate variables to make possible the expression of what would be expressed in PMese by

(Ef) fa, (g) gb, etc.

i.e. variables other than those which range over *particulars*, would this not be, in effect, to treat the atomic propositions which are supposedly represented perspicuously by, for example,

a

as involving two *constants*, and hence two *names*? Must not its truly perspicuous representation be rather

Green a

as Bergmann claims ?

Consider the following schema for translation from PMese into Jumblese:

PMese	*Jumblese*
I. *Names of particulars*	
a, b, c, ...	The same letters written in a variety of neutral styles, the variety being a matter of height, the neutrality a matter of the use of the ordinary font: a, b, c, …; a, b, c, ... ; a, b, c, ...
II. *Statements* (not including relational statements, which will be discussed shortly)	
Green a, red a, ...	**a**, *a*, …
III. *Statement functions*	
(1) *Predicate constant, individual variable*:	
Green x, red y, ...	**x**, *y*, ...

(2) *Predicate variable, individual constant*:

fa, gb, …	Names in neutral styles (see I):
	a, ...; a, ...; a, …

(3) *Predicate variable, individual variable*:

fx, gy, …	Name variables in neutral styles:
	x, y, z, ...; x, y, z, ...; x, y, z, …

IV. *Quantification*

(Ex) green x	(Ex) **x**
(Ef) fa, (Eg) ga, ...	(E() a, (E() a, …
(Ef) (Ex) fx, (Eg) (Ex) gx, ...	(E() (Ex) x, (E() (Ex) x, ...

Notice that in the final samples of Jumblese, the (-shaped symbols serve to represent a neutral style; *which* depends on its size.

It is to be noted that in this form of Jumblese, the neutral styles by virtue of which an expression functions as a name without making a statement is also the neutral style which is illustrated by the expressions serving as the counterparts of the predicate variables of PMese. It is therefore an interesting feature of this form of Jumblese that expressions which function as names but not as statements *have the form of a statement*. It is often said with reference to PMese that the form of a predicate is, for example,

Red x

It is less frequently said that the form of a name is, for example,

fa

In the variety of Jumblese sketched above, the latter would be as true as the former. (Cf. *Tractatus* 3.311.) This point clearly should be expanded to take account of the forms of relational statements, but I shall not attempt to do this, save by implication, on the present occasion.

Now the difficulty, if there is one, pertaining to predicate variables is not limited to predicate variables pertaining to these putative monadic atomic statements. If there were a point to be made along the above line, it would pertain as well to dyadic and polyadic statements as Wittgenstein interprets them. Thus, to continue with our translation schema, we have

PMese	*Jumblese*
Larger (ab), Redder (ab)	$\overset{a}{b}, \overset{a}{b}$
R(ab), S(ab), T(ab), ...	ab, a b, a b, …
Larger (xy), Redder (xy), ...	$\overset{x}{y}, \overset{x}{y}, \ldots$
R(xy), S(xy), ...	xy, x y, x y, ...
(Ex) (Ey) Larger (xy)	(Ex) (Ey) $\overset{x}{y}$
(ER) R(ab), (ES) S(ab), ...	(E..) ab, (E. .) a b, …
(ER) (Ex) (Ey) R(xy)	(E ..) (Ex) (Ey) xy

Here again we fnd the introduction of symbols to be the counterparts of the relation variables of PMese, i.e. symbols which illustrate the neutral manners which are used in

ab, a b, a b, a b, etc.

to express what is expressed in PMese by the statement functions

R(ab), S(ab), T(ab), etc.

Thus, in addition to the variables '(', '(', '(', ... which correspond to the one place predicate variables of *Principia*, we have the variables '..', '. .', '. .', … to correspond to the dyadic predicate variables of *Principia*.

The topic of perspicuousness with respect to variables and quantification is an interesting and important one in its own right, and the above remarks have barely scratched the surface. The only point I have wanted to make is that if considerations pertaining to quantification or to distinguishing between names and statements support the idea that the atomic statements of a perspicuous language must contain at least two names, these considerations would do so *not* by supporting the idea that a minimal atomic statement would contain the names of two *particulars*, but by supporting the idea that it would contain the name of a universal. In other words, they would point to Bergmann's form of logical atomism as contrasted with that of Wittgenstein.

Now I side with Wittgenstein on this matter, that is to say I would argue that the atomic descriptive statements of an ideal language would contain names of particulars only. As I see it, therefore, it is of crucial importance to ontology not to confuse the contrast between *constant* and *variable* with that between *name* and *variable*. For to confuse these two contrasts is to move from the correct idea that

Green a

can be viewed against the doubly quantified statement

(Ef) (Ex) fx

to the incorrect idea that

Green a

is the juxtaposition of two names, and says perspicuously what would be unperspicuously said by

a exemplifes green.

To view the Jumblese statement

a

against the doubly quantifed statement

$(E_{()})\ (x)\ x$

is, indeed, to highlight two facts about the expression '**a**', the fact by virtue of which it is a writing in some style or other of a certain name, and the fact by virtue of which, to speak metaphorically, green comes into the picture. But I see no reason to infer that because the expression's being a case of a certain name, and the expression's pertaining to green are each bound up with a monadic (though not, of course, atomic) fact about the expression, that both its being about a and its being about green come into the picture in the same way, i.e. that they are both *named*.

For the being about a and the being about green could each be true of the expression by virtue of monadic facts about it, and still not pertain to its meaning *in the same way* in any more important sense. The crucial thing about an expression is the role it plays in the language, and the fact that a certain expression is an 'a' in some style or other, and the fact that it is in

boldface, may both be monadic facts and yet play different roles in the language. In which connection it is relevant to note that the monadic fact about the expression by virtue of which it pertains to green is not the monadic fact that it is thick, but the monadic fact that it is a thick instance of a name or name variable.

II

Before continuing with the substantive argument of this paper, I shall say something more to the historical question as to whether Wittgenstein himself 'countenanced' monadic atomic facts. I have argued that the passages in which he speaks of atomic facts as confgurations of objects (in the plural) are not decisive, by pointing out that Russell might have spoken of atomic facts as related objects, but have so used the term 'relation' that one could speak of monadic relations. It seems to me that similar considerations prevent such passages as

> 2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a defnite way represents that the things are so combined with one another.
>
> 3.21 To the configuration of the single signs in the propositional sign corresponds the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs.

from deciding the issue against the idea that an atomic proposition could contain only one name.

On one occasion Wittgenstein seems to me to come as close to saying that there are monadic atomic propositions as he could have come without saying it in so many words. Thus consider

4.24 The names are the simple symbols. I indicate them by single letters (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’). The elementary proposition I write as function of the names, in the form ‘fx’, ‘ϕ(x, y)’, etc.

This passage is the more striking in that it occurs very shortly after

4.22 The elementary proposition consists of names. It is a connexion, a concatenation of names.

Now to interpret 4.24 it is important to note that although Wittgenstein tells us that atomic facts to the effect that two objects are dyadically related would be perspicuously represented by placing the names of these objects in dyadic relation without the use of any relation word, the *Tractatus* contains no *use* but only *mentions* (and indirect ones at that) of such perspicuous representations. Thus Wittgenstein does not *use* Jumblese, but always PMese, in illustrating the form of atomic propositions, thus always ‘aRb’ (cf. the ‘ϕ(x, y)’ of 4.24). What he does do is tell us that the symbol ‘R’ serves not as a name, but as a means of bringing it about that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ are dyadically related.

This being so, Wittgenstein is telling us in 4.24 that when he uses an expression of the form ‘fx’ to write an elementary proposition, the function *word* represented by the ‘f’ is occurring not as a name, but as bringing it about that the name represented by ‘x’ occurs in a certain manner, i.e. that the name as occurring in a certain monadic configuration is a proposition.

Now if a philosopher combines the two theses, (1) there are no atomic facts involving only one particular, (2) all objects are particulars, it would be reasonable to say that he is committed to a doctrine of bare particulars. For, speaking informally, he holds that though

objects stand in empirical relations, they have no qualities. Notice that this would not be true of Bergmann's position, for while he holds that there are no atomic facts containing only one *object*, he insists that there are atomic facts which contain only one *particular*. Thus he can deny that there are bare particulars by insisting that every object exemplifies a quality.

Now in my opinion Copi is correct in attributing to Wittgenstein the second of the above two theses (all objects are particulars). If, therefore, he were correct in attributing to Wittgenstein the first thesis, his claim that Wittgenstein is committed to a doctrine of bare particulars would be sound. Conversely, if Wittgenstein did hold a doctrine of bare particulars, then he was committed to the thesis that there are no monadic atomic facts. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Copi arguing that his contention that Wittgenstein rejects monadic atomic facts is supported by what he (somewhat reluctantly) takes to be an affirmation of the doctrine of bare particulars. Thus after confessing that "It must be admitted that several of Wittgenstein's remarks suggest that objects have 'external' properties as well as 'internal' ones (2.01231, 2.0233, 4.023)," he writes (p. 163):

> Despite the difficulty of dealing with such passages, there seems to me to be overwhelming evidence that he regarded objects as bare particulars, having no material properties whatever.
>
> In the first place, Wittgenstein explicitly denies that objects can have properties. His assertion that 'objects are colorless' (2.0232) must be understood as synechdochical, for the context makes it clear that he is not interested in denying color qualities only, but all qualities of 'material properties' (the term first appears in the immediately preceding paragraph (2.0232)).

Now I think that this is simply a misunderstanding. The correct interpretation of the passage in question requires only a careful reading of the context. What Wittgenstein says is "Roughly speaking (*Beilauefig gesprochen*): objects are colorless," and this remark occurs as a comment on

> 2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects.

What Wittgenstein is telling us here is that *objects* do not determine *facts*: thus even if a is green, the fact that a is green is not determined by a. It is interesting, in this connection, to reflect on

> 2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.

Thus, while a does not determine the fact that it is green, it does determine the range of possible facts of which the fact that it is green is but one.

Names exist in a logical space which includes the predicates which combine with it to make statements. (*In a perspicuous language —Jumblese—the predicate words, as has been pointed out, would appear as manners of being names, as, in a literal sense, internal features of the names.*) And no atomic statement is analytic, hence,

> 2.0132 In order to know an object, I must know not its external but its internal properties.

When Wittgenstein says that

2.0123 If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts.

this is as much as to say that if I understand a name, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic statements. When he says

2.013 Everything is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts.

this is as much as to say that every name is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic statements.[11] And when he says

2.0131 ... A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a color.

he is making the point that objects are internally related to sets of "external" properties, but not to any one "external" property, i.e. that names are internally related to sets of primitive predicates[12] (configurations; cf. Jumblese).

Thus it is not surprising to us (though disturbing to Copi) to find Wittgenstein saying in the passage following that in which he says that (roughly speaking) objects are colorless,

2.0233 Two objects of the same logical form are—apart from their external properties—only differentiated from one another in that they are different.

For this means *not*, as it might seem, that objects are *bare*, but simply that two objects of the same logical form[13] determine the same range of possible facts, i.e. two names of the same logical form belong to the same range of configurations.

As far as I can see, Copi's second argument to show that Wittgenstein's objects are bare particulars is also a misunderstanding. He begins by correctly pointing out that according to

Wittgenstein objects are named, whereas states of affairs are "described"—the word is Wittgenstein's. He then writes (p. 164):

> ... if an object *had* a property, that would be a fact whose assertion would constitute a *description* of that object. But objects can not be so described, whence it follows that objects have no properties.

This argument overlooks the fact that Wittgenstein, under the influence of logistical jargon, uses the term 'describe' where one would expect 'assert' (cf. 3.221). Thus he is simply telling us that objects cannot be 'described', i.e. *asserted*; from which it by no means follows that they can't be described in the ordinary sense. Indeed, in 4.023, Wittgenstein writes "As the description of an object describes it by its external properties, so propositions describe reality by its internal properties."

The third argument has the form "... if an object had a material property, that it had the property would be a fact involving only one particular, hence no object can have any material property, and all particulars are bare" (p. 164). The hypothetical is sound. The evidence adduced for denying the consequent is 4.032 which is interpreted as saying that all propositional signs are composite, and must consequently contain at least two elements, that is, at least two names. But 4.032 does not say that all propositional signs are *composite*, but that they are all "logically articulated," and I have attempted to explain how a propositional sign can consist of *one logically articulated name*. I grant that in a parenthetical remark which immediately follows Wittgenstein writes, "(Even the proposition 'ambulo' is composite for its stem gives a different sense with another termination, or its termination with another stem)," but I do not believe that this remark, which correctly points out that ordinary Latin is not perspicuous with respect to logical articulation, is decisive. (I am happy to acknowledge that my interpretation, like Copi's

has its difficulties).

Copi's concluding argument is to the effect that Wittgenstein tells us in the *Investigations* that the objects of the *Tractatus* were primary elements like those described in the *Theaetetus* (21e). This would be cogent if we were given a reason for supposing either that the elements of Theaetetus 21e were bare particulars, or that Wittgenstein thought they were. I see no reason to think that either is the case.

The most telling argument in Copi's paper against the idea that the *Tractatus* countenanced monadic atomic facts is not used by Copi directly to this end, but as part of his brief for the sound thesis that Wittgenstein's objects are not properties. Slightly redirected, it is to the effect that if there are any monadic atomic facts, surely they include such facts as that a certain point in a visual field is red. But, the argument proceeds, if 'a is red' is an elementary proposition, then 'a is blue' cannot contradict it. But, as is well known, Wittgenstein tells us (6.3751) that "For two colors, e.g., to be at one place in the visual feld, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of color... (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction.)" Copi draws the conclusion (p. 162) that "color predications are *not* elementary predications."

Now, two points require to be made in this connection. The first is that one might be convinced that there *could* be monadic atomic facts (in that peculiar sense in which, for any n there could be n-adic atomic facts) without being able to give any examples. It is worth noting, in this connection, that in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, Moore, in effect, wonders whether there are any qualities (as opposed to relational properties), and specifically explores the logical space of colors to see if it provides us with examples of qualities. Moore was prepared to find that there are no qualities, i.e. that the simplest facts are already relational. True,

Moore's qualitative facts would be Bergmanian rather than Wittgensteinian, that is, would each be a nexus of a particular *and a universal*, but the fact that Moore was prepared to suspend judgment with respect to the question "Are there qualities?" combined with the fact that he found the logical structure of color to be very complex indeed, suggests that Wittgenstein might well have taken a similar attitude. After all, as Anscombe points out, Wittgenstein regards it as in some sense a matter of fact that the most complex atomic *fact* is n-adic rather than m-adic (m>n) — cf. 4.2211. Could it not be in the same sense a matter of fact that the least complex is, say, dyadic rather than monadic?

Thus, perhaps the correct answer to the historical question is that Wittgenstein would have regarded the question 'Are particulars bare?' as, in a deep sense, a factual one, a question to which he did not claim to have the answer, and to which, as logician, he was not required to have the answer.

The second remark is that Wittgenstein may well have thought that there are monadic atomic facts, indeed that their existence is obvious, but that no statement in ordinary usage represented such a fact, so that no example could be given in the sense of written down. Although he thought that ordinary language contained elementary propositions, he emphasizes that they are contained in a way which is not perspicuous. There is no presupposition that any ordinary sentence as ordinarily used in the context of everyday life ever expresses an atomic proposition. Indeed, the presupposition is to the contrary.

III

It has been said by Broad, among others, that philosophers have been led into error in perception theory by concentrating their attention on visual examples. In my opinion they have

been at least as frequently led into error in logical theory by a similar concentration on color. The danger arises from the fact that such a word as ‘red’, for example, is really three words, an adjective, a common noun and a proper name, rolled into one. Thus we can say, with equal propriety,

The book is red

Scarlet is a color

Red is a color

A moment ago I urged the importance of the distinction between descriptive *constants* and *names*. I suggested that while it would be correct to say that the statement

Green a

consists of two *constants*, as is brought out by viewing it against the three quantified statements,

(Ex) Green x

(Ef) fa

(Ef) (Ex) fx

it is most misleading to say that it consists of two names. And the reason, by now, should be clear. For if one does view the sentence ‘Green a’ as a juxtaposition of names, one will be bound, particularly if one has read the *Tractatus*, to think that by juxtaposing the names ‘Green’ and ‘a’ it affirms that the two objects or individuals or logical subjects *green* and a are ‘united’ or ‘hang in each other’ or are bound together by a ‘characterizing tie’ or whatever.

Now what makes this move all the more plausible is that there *is* an object *green* and that there *is* a relation which is often called exemplification, such that if a is green *then it is also true*

that a exemplifies green. Thus it is tempting indeed to say that

a exemplifies green

is simply an unperspicuous way of saying what is said perspicuously by

Green a

And the fascinating thing about it is that this claim would be absolutely correct *provided that 'green a' was not taken to say what is ordinarily said by 'a is green'*.

The point stands out like a sore thumb if one leave colors aside and uses a geometrical example. Thus consider the statement

a is triangular

or, for our purposes,

Triangular a

It would clearly be odd to say

a exemplifies triangular

although it is not odd to say

a exemplifies green.

The reason is that 'triangular' unlike 'green' does not function in ordinary usage as both an adjective and a singular term. What we must say is

a exemplifies triangularity.

Now in a perspicuous language, i.e. a language which had a built-in protection against Bradley's puzzle we might say *that a exemplifies triangularity* by concatenating 'a' and 'triangularity' or *that Socrates exemplifies Wisdom* by writing

Socrates : Wisdom.

Our language is not such a perspicuous one, and to bring this out in this connection, we might write,

We must not say, 'The complex sign "a exemplifies triangularity" says "a stands in the exemplification relation to triangularity",' but we must say '*that* "a" stands in a certain relation to "triangularity" says that a exemplifies triangularity.'

Thus it is correct to say that

Green a

says perspicuously what is said by

a exemplifies green

only if 'green' is used in the sense of the singular term 'greenness'. And when it is used in this sense, the statement

Green a

does not have the sense of the ordinary statement

a is green,

though it is logically equivalent to it.

Professor Bergmann thinks that

Green a

consists of two names, ‘a’, the name of a particular, and ‘green’, the name of a universal, and, by being their juxtaposition, asserts that the one exemplifies the other. On his view, philosophers who insist that ‘a is green’ says that a exemplifies green but do not realize that ‘a exemplifies green’ is simply an unperspicuous way of juxtaposing ‘a’ with ‘green’ are attempting to eff the ineffable. He thinks, to use the terminology I proposed earlier, that exemplification is the nexus, the mode of configuration of objects which can only be expressed by a configuration of names. Professor Bergmann sees configurations of particulars and universals where Wittgenstein saw only configurations of particulars.

But what does

a exemplifies triangularity

say if it isn’t an unperspicuous way of saying

Triangular a

Instead of giving an answer (as I have attempted to do on other occasions) I shall attempt an analogy, and then claim that it is more than a mere analogy. It seems to me that the necessary equivalence but non-synonymy of

a exemplifes triangularity

with

a is triangular

is analogous to the necessary equivalence but non-synonymy of

That a is triangular is true

with

a is triangular

That the analogy is more than a mere analogy is suggested by the fact that instead of saying that a exemplifies triangularity, we might with equal propriety say that triangularity is true of a, or holds of a.

Now if

a exemplifes triangularity

triangularity is true of a

triangularity holds of a

are to be elucidated in terms of

That a is triangular is true

then exemplification is no more present in the world of fact in that narrow sense which tractarians like Professor Bergmann and myself find illuminating, than is meaning, or truth, *and for the same reason*.

The crucial ineffability in the *Tractatus* concerns the relation between statements and facts. Is there such a relation? And is it ineffable? The answer seems to me to be the following. There is a meaning relation between statements and *facts*, but both terms are in the linguistic order. To say that a statement means a fact is to say, for example,

‘Gruen a’ (in German) means *Green a,* and it is a fact that Green a,

The first conjunct appears to assert a relation between a linguistic and a nonlinguistic item, between a statement and an item in the real order. And the second conjunct to say of this item that it is a fact. As I see it, the first conjunct does assert a relation, but the relation obtains between a German expression and an English expression *as being an expression in our language*. It has the force of

‘Gruen a’ (in German) corresponds to ‘Green a’ in our language.

We could also put this by saying

‘Gruen a’ (in German) means *that green a*

for to put ‘that’ before a sentence has the force of quoting it with the implication that the sentence is in our language, and is being considered as such. The reason why we find it counter-intuitive to put it in this way is that since ‘means’ is the translation rubric, this would conflict with the usage according to which we say

‘Dass gruen a’ (in German) means *that green a*

Suppose it is granted that meaning is the translatability relation between an expression which may or may not be in our language and one which is, and is being considered as such. What, then, does it mean to say

That green a is a fact

Clearly this is equivalent to saying

That green a is true

which calls to mind the equivalence

That green a is true ≡ green a

This, however, is not the most perspicuous way to represent matters, for while the equivalence obtains, indeed necessarily obtains, its truth depends on the principle of inference—and this is the crux—

From ‘that green a is true’ (in our language) to infer ‘green a’ (in our language).

And it is by virtue of the fact that we *draw* such inferences that meaning and truth talk gets its connection with the world. In this sense, the connection is *done* rather than *talked about*.

Viewed from this perspective, Wittgenstein’s later conception of a language as a form of life is already foreshadowed by the ineffability thesis of the *Tractatus*. But to see this is to see that no ineffability is involved. For while to infer is neither to refer to that which can be referred to, nor to assert that which can be asserted, this does not mean that it is to fail to eff something which is, therefore, ineffable.

[1] *Mind*, 67, 1958.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 16.
[3] Which n-adic concept the names are made to satisfy is, of course, as philosophers use the term, a matter of convention.
[4] One is reminded of the peculiar objects which, according to Frege, one talks about when one attempts to talk about concepts.
[5] I shall subsequently discuss the dangers involved in the use of color examples with particular reference to the interpretation of color words as names.
[6] The philosopher I have in mind is Professor Gustav Bergmann and the views I am discussing are those to be found, I believe, in certain passages of his interesting paper on "Ineffability, Ontology and Method" which appeared in the January 1960 number of the *Philosophical Review*.
[7] Cf. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, p. 23, n. 2.
[8] I use this way of putting the matter to make the point with minimum fuss and feathers. It is worth reflecting, however, that the grammatical parallel to 'a exemplifes green' would be either 'a exemplifes being below b' or 'a and b jointly exemplify below-ness (the relation of one thing being below another)'.
[9] Strictly speaking, there would be a relation of exemplification for each order of fact, and, on non-elementaristic views, a family of such relations for each type.
[10] See fn. 9.
[11] When he adds that "I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space," he suggests the intriguing possibility that we can make sense of the idea that the language we use might have had no application.
[12] Whether these sets constitute embracing sets of primitive predicates of different orders, or whether they fall into subsets (families of determinates) is a topic for separate investigation.
[13] I find here the implication that primitive one-place predicates (configurations)—if not all primitive predicates—come in families (determinates) and that objects are of different logical form if, for example, one exists in the logical space of color, the other in the logical space of sound.